Table 15 Solution concepts and human behaviour (Fang et al., 1993 ; Hipel et al., 1997 )
From: The Ontario nuclear power dispute: a strategic analysis
Solution Concept | Stability Description | Foresight | Knowledge of Preference | Disimprovement | Strategic Risk |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Nash | DM cannot move unilaterally to a more preferred state | Low | Own | Never | Ignores risk |
SEQ | All DM’s unilateral improvements are sanctioned by subsequent unilateral improvements by others | Medium | All | Never | Takes some risks |
GMR | All DM’s unilateral Improvements are sanctioned by subsequent unilateral moves by others | Medium | Own | By opponent | Avoids risks |
SMR | All DM’s unilateral improvements are sanctioned, even after response by the DM | Medium | Own | By opponent | Avoids risks |